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 1 
Crowdfunding	Public	Interest	Judicial	Reviews:	A	Risky	New	
Resource	and	the	Case	for	a	Practical	Ethics	
	
Joe	Tomlinson
*
	
	
In	their	classic	work	on	public	interest	litigation	(‘PIL’),	Harlow	and	Rawlings	define	“pressure	
through	law”	as	the	“use	of	the	law	and	legal	techniques	as	an	instrument	for	obtaining	wider	
collective	objectives.”
1
	They	observe	that	the	use	of	the	courts	by	organisations	seeking	policy	
change	was	not	just	an	American	trend,	it	was	happening	in	the	UK	and	nor	was	it	new.
2
	The	
quickly-growing	literature	on	PIL	has	studied	how	some	organisations	deploy	the	law	and	legal	
techniques	 to	 pursue	 wider	 objectives.
3
	 Much	 of	 the	 international	 debate	 around	 this	
“mobilization	 of	 law”—from	 Vose’s	 early	 account	 of	 disadvantage	 theory	 in	 the	 1950s
4
	
through	to	current	debates	on	“legal	opportunity	structures”
5
—has	a	consistent	thread:	the	
availability	of	financial	resources	often	has	a	profound	effect	on	the	fate	of	individual	PIL	cases	
and	the	wider	pattern	of	PIL	in	different	jurisdictions.	The	proposition	that	funding	is	a	key	
variable	in	determining	patterns	of	PIL	is	an	utterly	uncontroversial	one,	and	one	which	has	
sustained	 over	 time.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 judicial	 review	 in	 the	 UK,	 traditional	 funding	 for	
                                                
*
	Lecturer	in	Public	Law,	Dickson	Poon	School	of	Law,	King’s	College	London,	and	Research	Director,	Public	Law	
Project.	This	article	is	written	in	my	personal	capacity	and	it	does	not	express	the	views	of	the	Public	Law	Project.	
I	am	very	grateful	for	exceptional	research	assistance	from	Ravi	Low-Beer,	as	well	as	indirect	support	from	the	
UCL	 Grand	 Challenges	 Fund,	 Tom	 Hickman,	 and	 Lisa	 Vanhala.	 Carol	 Harlow,	 Jo	 Hickman,	 Richard	 Kirkham,	
Maurice	Sunkin,	and	Graham	Gee	provided	helpful	comments	on	various	drafts.	An	earlier	version	of	this	paper	
was	presented	at	the	University	of	Oxford	Centre	for	Socio-Legal	Studies,	where	seminar	participants	offered	
many	useful	comments.	A	later	draft	was	also	given	as	a	lecture	at	the	University	of	Essex.	A	visiting	position	at	
Melbourne	Law	School	provided	the	environment	for	this	article	to	be	completed.	Any	errors	are	my	own.	
1		
C.	Harlow	and	R.	Rawlings,	Pressure	Through	Law	(London:	Routledge,	1992).	
2
		Above	p.1.	
3
	See	e.g.	V.	Bondy,	L.	Platt,	and	M.	Sunkin,	The	Value	and	Effects	of	Judicial	Review:	The	Nature	of	Claims,	their	
Outcomes	and	Consequences	 (London:	The	Public	Law	Project,	2015);	C.	Hilson,	“New	social	movements:	the	
role	of	legal	opportunity”	(2002)	9(2)	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy	238;	The	Public	Law	Project,	Third	Party	
Interventions:	A	Practical	Guide	(London:	Public	Law	Project,	2008);	The	Public	Law	Project,	Guide	to	Strategic	
Litigation	 (London:	Public	Law	Project,	2014).	 I	will	not	discuss	 the	 legitimacy	of	 this	use	of	 the	courts,	 for	a	
critical	analysis	see:	C.	Harlow,	“Public	Law	and	Popular	Justice”	(2002)	65(1)	M.L.R.	1.	
4
	C.	Vose,	Caucasians	Only	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1959),	pp.119,	240.	
5
	e.g.	C.	Hilson,	“New	social	movements:	The	role	of	legal	opportunity”	(2002)	9	J.E.P.L	238;	E.A.	Andersen,	Out	
of	the	closets	and	into	the	courts:	Legal	opportunity	structure	and	gay	rights	litigation	(Ann	Arbor:	University	of	
Michigan	Press,	2006);	L.	Vanhala,	“Legal	opportunity	structures	and	the	paradox	of	legal	mobilization	by	the	
environmental	movement	in	the	UK”	(2012)	45	Law	&	Society	Review	523.	For	earlier,	similar	work,	see.	C.R.	
Epp,	 The	 Rights	 Revolution:	 Lawyers,	 Activists,	 and	 Supreme	 Courts	 in	 Comparative	 Perspective	 (Chicago:	
University	of	Chicago	Press,	1998).	
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litigation	has	become	less	available	in	recent	years.
6
	While	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	
the	relationship	between	money	and	access	to	judicial	review	is	a	densely	complex	one,	many	
now	claim	that	funding	a	judicial	review	is	increasingly	difficult.	In	this	space,	crowdfunding—
using	an	online	platform	to	raise	third-party	funds—has	become	an	increasingly-used	tool,	
with	many	PIL	challenges	now	being	funded	by	this	method.
7
	There	has,	however,	been	no	
systematic	analysis	of	this	phenomenon	in	the	UK,	and	relatively	little	internationally.
8
		
In	 this	 article,	 it	 is	 considered	 whether	 crowdfunding	 is	 a	 possible	 answer	 to	 the	
increasing	scarcity	of	traditional	resources	in	the	context	of	PIL	in	the	UK.	In	other	words,	can	
crowdfunding	 support	 reform	through	 the	provision	of	 resources	 for	PIL?	The	question	of	
whether	this	mode	of	litigation	funding	ought	to	be	encouraged	or	whether	it	is	problematic	
is	 also	 addressed.	 I	 argue	 that	 crowdfunding	 can—in	 certain	 cases—solve	 the	 resource	
shortage	and,	ultimately,	be	useful	in	procuring	reform.
9
	However,	it	is	far	from	a	foolproof	
solution	and	there	are	multiple	risks	inherent	in	its	use.	The	nature	and	extent	of	these	risks	
are	such	that	the	crowdfunding	of	PIL	should	be	approached	with	great	caution.	It	is	therefore	
suggested	here	that	we	need	to	develop	a	practical	ethics	of	crowdfunding	in	this	context.		
	 The	 analysis	 in	 this	 article	 has	 four	main	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 explains	 the	 present	
funding	context	for	judicial	review	in	the	UK.	It	is	imperative	this	context	is	understood	as	it	
provides	 the	 conditions	 in	which	 crowdfunding	has	 grown.	The	 second	part	of	 this	 article	
introduces	how	crowdfunding	works,	how	it	has	become	increasingly	relied-upon	as	a	method	
for	funding	judicial	review	cases,	who	the	key	actors	are,	and	examples	of	crowdfunding	in	
action.	 The	 third	 part	 considers	 the	 main	 benefits	 and	 risks	 of	 the	 increased	 role	 that	
crowdfunding	is	playing	in	the	UK.	The	final	part	of	this	article	sets	out	the	case	for	developing	
                                                
6
	PIL	does	not	necessarily	have	to	take	the	form	of	judicial	review.	See	for	instance	the	actions	documented	in	
G.	Howells,	The	Tobacco	Challenge:	Legal	Policy	and	Consumer	Protection	(Abingdon:	Routledge,	2011).	There	is	
an	 argument	 that	 all	 cases	 have,	 in	 a	way,	 a	 public	 interest	 justification,	 as	 explained	 in	 R	 (UNISON)	 v	 Lord	
Chancellor	[2017]	UKSC	51;	[2017]	3	W.L.R.	409.	The	focus	here,	however,	is	judicial	review,	which	is	the	primary	
means	of	PIL	in	the	UK.		
7
	This	is	an	international	trend.	Here	I	focus	on	providing	a	detailed	study	of	the	UK	experience.	
8
	See	E.	Hamman,	“Save	the	Reef!	Civic	crowdfunding	and	public	interest	environmental	litigation”	(2015)	15(1)	
Q.U.T.L.R.	159;	M.A.	Gomez,	“Crowdfunded	Justice:	On	the	Potential	Benefits	and	Challenges	of	Crowdfunding	
as	a	Litigation	Financing	Tool”	(2015)	49	U.S.F.L.R.	307;	M.	Elliot,	“Trial	by	Social-Media:	The	Rise	of	Litigation	
Crowdfunding”	(2016)	84(2)	U.C.L.R.	529;	R.	Perry,	“Crowdfunding	Civil	Justice”	(2018)	B.C.L.R.	(forthcoming).		
9
	The	notion	of	“public	interest”	litigation	is	fiercely	contested.	I	simply	use	it	here	to	mean	the	use	of	the	law	
and	 legal	 techniques	as	an	 instrument	 for	obtaining	wider	 collective	objectives.	This	may	simply	 involve	 the	
settle	of	legal	questions	and	need	not	be	informed	by	any	ideology.	
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a	practical	ethics	for	crowdfunding	PIL	and	sketches	out	the	form	that	such	a	practical	ethics	
may	take.	
 
Access	to	Judicial	Review,	Financial	Resources,	and	Funding	
The	suggestion	that	legal	procedures	cost	significant	amounts	of	money	and	that	there	should	
be	practical	mechanisms	for	managing	such	expenses	is	not	new,	nor	is	it	particular	to	public	
law.
10
	The	concern	that	judicial	review	is	too	expensive	for	ordinary	citizens	has	also	long	been	
discussed.
11
	Yet,	the	complex	socio-economic	dimensions	of	judicial	review	litigation	have	not	
been	squarely	confronted	by	public	law	researchers	in	the	UK.
12
	Indeed,	the	topic	is	so	little	
discussed	by	scholars	that	Rawlings	suggests	it	is	part	of	“the	secret	history”	of	judicial	review:	
where	the	widely-observed	expansion	of	judicial	review	grounds	in	recent	decades	has	been	
quietly	“engendered	on	the	back	of	large-scale	exclusion”	of	people.
13
		
In	recent	years,	concerns	about	the	expense	of	judicial	review	have	been	put	under	
the	 spotlight	by	 the	general	programme	of	austerity	 implemented	by	 the	UK	government	
from	2010	onwards,
14
	as	well	as	the	reforms	undertaken	and	attempted	concerning	judicial	
review	 specifically.
15
	Notably,	when	 the	UK	Government	proposed	 changes	 to	 the	 judicial	
review	system	in	2012,	the	consultation	process	cited	the	growing	number	of	“weak	or	ill-
founded	claims”	that	were	taking	up	“large	amounts	of	 judicial	time	and	costing	the	court	
system	money.”
16
	The	impact	of	these	changes—and	the	associated	political	rhetoric	about	
the	government-side	expense	of	judicial	review—has	led	to	growing	concern	about	access	to	
justice	and	the	limiting		of	who	is	able	to	hold	public	bodies	to	account	via	the	process.	The	
position	now	is	that	the	costs	of	judicial	review	for	both	claimants	and	public	authorities	have	
been	largely	without	empirical	study	but	those	same	issues	have	become	more	central	to	the	
                                                
10
	See,	for	example,	the	historical	debate	in	civil	justice	traced	in	J.	Sorbaji,	English	Civil	Justice	after	the	Woolf	
and	Jackson	Reforms:	A	Critical	Analysis	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2014).	
11
	This	issue	was	recently	raised	again	in	a	prominent	blog,	see:	T.	Hickman,	“Public	Law’s	Disgrace”	(February	9	
2017)	 UK	 Constitutional	 Law	 Blog,	 https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/09/tom-hickman-public-laws-
disgrace/	[Accessed	February	22,	2018].	
12
	See	the	discussion	in	Bondy,	Platt,	and	Sunkin,	The	Value	and	Effects	of	Judicial	Review:	The	Nature	of	Claims,	
their	Outcomes	and	Consequences	(2015),	pp.47-58.	
13
	R.	Rawlings,	“Modelling	Judicial	Review”	(2008)	61(1)	C.L.P.	95,	109.	
14
	The	effects	of	austerity	have	affected	many	parts	of	the	administrative	justice	system,	not	just	the	judicial	
review	 system.	 For	 an	 overview	 and	 analysis,	 see	 R.	 Thomas	 and	 J.	 Tomlinson,	 “Mapping	 current	 issues	 in	
administrative	justice:	austerity	and	the	‘more	bureaucratic	rationality’	approach”	(2017)	39(3)	J.S.W.F.L.	380.	
15
	Ministry	of	Justice,	Judicial	Review:	Proposals	for	further	reform	(London:	Cm	8703,	2014).	
16
	 Ministry	 of	 Justice,	 “Judicial	 review	 consultation–Press	 Release”	 (13	 December	 2012),	
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/judicial-review-consultation	[Accessed	February	22,	2018].	
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shaping	of	government	policy—and	the	public	debate—on	judicial	review.		Though	this	article	
is	not	the	place	to	provide	it,	there	is	certainly	an	urgent	need	for	a	thorough	and	wide-ranging	
assessment	of	the	“economy”	of	the	modern	judicial	review	system.		
The	core	concern	of	this	article—crowdfunding—relates	specifically	to	the	funding	of	
judicial	review	cases.
17
	In	respect	of	funding	a	case,	two	issues	need	to	be	considered	by	any	
prospective	judicial	review	claimant	at	the	outset:	paying	their	own	legal	fees	and	expenses,	
and	budgeting	to	pay	the	other	side’s	costs	if	the	claim	fails.	There	are	three	main	ways	for	
claimants	 to	 pay	 their	 own	 lawyer	 costs:	 paying	 from	 existing	 funds;	 entering	 into	 a	
conditional	fee	agreement	(a	“CFA”)	with	solicitors	and/or	counsel;	or	obtaining	a	grant	of	
legal	aid.
18
		
For	those	paying	from	their	own	pockets,	solicitors	typically	bill	their	time	at	hourly	
rates	depending	on	the	seniority	of	the	fee	earner,	or	at	a	fixed	fee	(for	the	whole	case	or	for	
stages	 of	 it),	 or	 a	 combination	 of	 both.	 The	 level	 of	 funds	 needed	 for	 lawyer	 fees	 and	
disbursements	varies	widely	per	case.	It	is	clear,	however,	the	cost	of	bringing	a	judicial	review	
claim	that	goes	to	a	full	hearing	may	be	considerable	(lessened	if	the	claimant	wants	to	bring	
a	claim	as	a	litigant	in	person).	A	2007	estimate	placed	the	costs	in	the	region	of	£10,000	to	
£20,000	for	a	straightforward	case,	possibly	much	higher	for	a	more	complex	matter.
19
	This	
has	 likely	 increased	in	the	decade	since	the	estimate	was	made.	Hickman,	writing	in	2017,	
estimates	that	a	“very	simple	two	hour	 judicial	 review	against	a	government	department”	
would	cost	around	£8,000	to	£10,000.
20
	A	“moderately	complex	claim	lasting	a	day	and	not	
brought	against	a	central	government	department”	would	run	in	excess	of	£40,000,	plus	VAT.	
For	a	“substantial	two	day	judicial	review,”	Hickman	estimates	costs	will	run	to	£80,000	and	
£200,000.	While	there	is	an	absence	of	recent	systematic	data,	legal	fees	are	clearly	significant	
amounts.	It	must	also	be	noted	that	if	a	claimant	is	unsuccessful,	they	are	likely	to	be	liable	
for	the	defendant’s	costs	as	well	as	their	own.	They	are	therefore	 looking	at	a	 legal	bill	of	
                                                
17
	Other	key	aspects	of	the	“economy”	of	judicial	review	include	court	fees,	costs	rules,	etc.	
18
	 Legal	 aid	 grants	 come	with	 a	 level	 of	 costs	 protection	 too.	 Before	 the	 event	 insurance	 policies	 (typically	
included	 in	 home	 and	 motor	 insurance	 policies)	 fund	 various	 types	 of	 litigation,	 but	 are	 ill-suited	 to	 non-
monetary	claims	where	remedies	are	discretionary,	and	so	are	not	generally	available	to	cover	judicial	review	
proceedings.	
19
	The	Public	Law	Project,	How	to	fund	a	judicial	review	claim	when	public	funding	is	not	available	(London:	The	
Public	Law	Project,	2007),	para.1,	which	was	 informed	by	discussion	which	practitioners.	Further	and	similar	
estimates	 are	 available	 in	 a	 response	 to	 a	Ministry	of	 Justice	Consultation	made	available	 via	 a	 Freedom	of	
Information	Act	2000	(FOIA)	request,	see	FOIA	Request	No.	171204020.	
20
	Hickman,	“Public	Law’s	Disgrace”.	
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upwards	of	£30,000	if	they	lose,	and	they	must	be	prepared	for	this	eventuality,	while	all	the	
time	bearing	in	mind	the	general	unpredictability	of	judicial	review	proceedings,	adjudication,	
and	costs	orders.		
CFAs	are	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 “no	win	no	 fee	agreements.”	 In	 judicial	 review	
cases,	they	are	agreements	between	claimants	and	their	lawyers	that	require	the	lawyers	to	
agree	to	act	in	a	case	on	the	basis	that	they	will	only	be	paid	if	the	case	is	successful.	Lawyers	
are	able	to	charge	a	success	fee	of	up	to	100%	if	the	case	is	won	to	compensate	them	for	the	
risk	of	being	paid	nothing.	However,	since	April	2013,	success	fees	are	no	longer	recoverable	
from	 the	 defendant,	 but	must	 instead	 be	 paid	 by	 the	 claimant.	 Given	 the	 non-monetary	
nature	of	judicial	review,	the	prospect	of	paying	a	success	fee	often	makes	a	CFA	expensive	
and	unattractive.	For	this	reason,	many	judicial	review	claimants	will	only	be	able	to	proceed	
if	 they	 can	 agree	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 CFA	 commonly	 known	 as	 a	 “CFA-Lite”.	 This	 is	 an	
agreement	which	limits	the	costs	payable	to	the	solicitor	to	the	amount	of	costs	that	may	be	
recovered	 from	the	other	 side	 (which	 the	claimant	has	 to	agree	 to	pursue),	and	does	not	
require	the	claimant	to	pay	the	lawyers	a	success	fee.	If	the	case	is	successful	and	an	 inter	
partes	costs	order	 is	obtained,	the	claimant’s	 lawyers	can	recover	their	 full	 fees.	CFA-Lites	
may	be	used	in	conjunction	with	fixed	fees.	
A	fixed	fee	can	be	agreed	with	lawyers	to	perhaps	get	around	some	of	the	difficulties	
faced	with	high	fees.
	
However,	agreeing	fixed	fees	at	the	outset	is	risky	for	lawyers	since	they	
will	not	generally	have	had	an	opportunity	to	fully	engage	with	the	case	papers,	and	judicial	
review	litigation	is	often	unpredictable	even	if	well	prepared.	As	such,	fixed	fees	are	often	
charged	in	conjunction	with	a	CFA,	as	a	means	of	reducing	the	lawyers’	exposure,	with	full	
fees	payable	in	the	event	that	an	inter	partes	costs	order	is	obtained—this	is	commonly	called	
a	Discounted	Fee	Agreement.	
	 Legal	aid	is	another	key	source	of	funding.	The	specific	provisions	governing	the	grant	
of	legal	aid	in	judicial	review	have	a	byzantine	complexity.	Broadly	speaking,	there	are	two	
types	of	legal	aid	relevant	to	judicial	review.	There	is	Legal	Help,	which	covers	initial	advice	
and	assistance.	There	is	also	Legal	Representation.	Legal	Help	is	a	type	of	“controlled	work,”	
which	solicitors	have	contractual	rights	to	self-grant.	Lawyers	are	paid	a	fixed	fee,	currently	
£259,	regardless	of	the	amount	of	work	carried	out,	unless	actual	costs	exceed	the	fixed	fee	
by	a	factor	of	three	or	more,	in	which	case,	an	hourly	rate	can	be	claimed	in	the	full	amount	
(this	assessed	on	a	case	by	case	basis	by	 the	Legal	Aid	Agency).	The	Legal	Representation	
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3257787 
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category	itself	 involves	two	types	of	legal	aid:	Investigative	Representation,	which	typically	
covers	work	to	be	done	to	establish	the	merits	of	a	potential	claim;	and	Full	Representation,	
which	 covers	 work	 to	 be	 done	 from	 the	 issuing	 of	 proceedings.	 Investigative	 and	 Full	
Representation	are	categories	of	work	known	as	“licensed	work”	for	which,	save	in	certain	
prescribed	exceptional	circumstances,	permission	needs	to	be	sought	 in	advance	from	the	
Legal	Aid	Agency.	Lawyers	are	paid	per	hour	at	rates	fixed	by	regulation.
21
	Solicitors	prepare	
a	bill	at	the	end	of	a	case,	including	all	the	disbursements	incurred	such	as	counsels’,	experts’,	
and	court	fees.	Each	bill	is	assessed	either	by	the	Legal	Aid	Agency	(if	either	the	bill	is	less	than	
£2500,	or	if	proceedings	were	not	issued),	or	by	the	court.	If	an	order	is	obtained	that	another	
party	must	pay	the	legally	aided	person’s	costs,	the	solicitors	send	the	bill	to	the	paying	party	
for	payment.	 If	agreement	on	 the	size	of	 the	bill	 cannot	be	 reached,	 the	solicitors	 for	 the	
receiving	party	can	commence	assessment	proceedings	to	get	the	bill	assessed	by	the	court.	
Eligibility	 for	 legal	 aid	 is	 governed	by	 legislation,	 the	provisions	 and	 applications	of	which	
determines:	whether	 a	 claim	 if	 of	 a	 kind	 that	 is	 ‘within	 scope’	 and	eligible	 for	 legal	 aid;
22
	
whether	the	applicant	for	legal	aid	satisfies	the	‘means	test’;
23
	and	whether	the	merits	of	the	
claim	are	sufficient	to	satisfy	the	merits	test.
24
		
Recent	reforms	to	legal	aid	have	caused	widespread	concern	in	the	legal	community.
25
	
In	 the	 context	of	 judicial	 review,	Hickman	has	 argued	powerfully	 that	 they	are	part	of	 an	
access	to	 justice	crisis	 that	 is	“public	 law’s	disgrace.”
26
	He	argues	that	the	most	 important	
component	of	legal	aid,	at	least	as	it	applies	in	the	field	of	public	law,	is	not	that	it	provides	a	
source	of	 funding	 for	a	person’s	 lawyers	but	because	 it	 comes	with	protection	against	an	
adverse	costs	order.	He	observes	that	“today	very	few	people	now	qualify	for	legal	aid.”
27
	This	
is,	 in	 large	 part,	 because	 of	 substantial	 restrictions	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 legal	 aid	 and	 the	
application	of	 the	means	test.
28
	For	Hickman,	 the	ground-level	 reality	 is	 that	“people	who	
have	£169.15	or	more	per	week	for	themselves	and	their	family	to	live	off,	or	who	have	any	
                                                
21
	Civil	Legal	Aid	(Remuneration)	Regulations	2013	(SI	2013/422)	Sch.1	para.3.	
22
	Legal	Aid	Sentencing	and	Punishment	of	Offenders	Act	2012	s.9	and	s.10.	
23
	Civil	Legal	Aid	(Financial	Resources	and	Payment	for	Services)	Regulations	2013	(SI	2013/480)	(as	amended).	
24
	Civil	Legal	Aid	(Merits	Criteria)	Regulations	2013	(SI	2013/104)	(as	amended).	
25
	The	statutory	lynchpin	of	these	reforms	was	the	Legal	Aid,	Sentencing	and	Punishment	of	Offenders	Act	2012.	
Such	concern	was,	for	instance,	well-documented	in	the	discussion	around	the	Bach	Commission,	see	The	Bach	
Commission,	The	Right	to	Justice	(London:	Fabien	Society,	2017).	
26
	Hickman,	“Public	Law’s	Disgrace”.	
27
	Above.	
28
	Legal	Aid	Agency,	Means	Assessment	Guidance	(April	2015).	See	further:	D.	Hirsch,	Priced	out	of	Justice?	Means	
testing	legal	aid	and	making	ends	meet	(Law	Society:	London,	2018).	
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significant	 assets,	 do	 not	 qualify	 for	 legal	 aid.”
29
	 Added	 to	 this,	 the	 government	 also	
introduced	a	"no	permission,	no	fee"	arrangement,	where	representatives	only	get	fees	for	
legal	 aid	 work	 at	 permission	 stage	 if	 the	 application	 is	 granted.
30
	 The	 effect	 of	 these	
arrangements	was	challenged	via	judicial	review	and,	as	a	result,	payment	is	now	available	in	
cases	where	the	defendant	withdraws	the	decision	under	challenge,	the	court	orders	an	oral	
hearing,	or	the	court	orders	a	rolled-up	hearing	of	both	the	permission	and	substantive	issues	
at	the	same	time.
31
	The	general	principle	of	the	arrangement,	however,	still	remains	in	force.	
Hickman’s	 analysis—and	 its	 characterisation	of	 access	 to	 judicial	 review	as	 a	 “disgrace”—
struck	a	chord	with	practitioners,	both	in	portraying	the	role	of	legal	aid	in	judicial	review	and	
highlighting	 the	wider	 issue	of	 costs.	Assessing	 the	precise	 size	of	 the	problem	 is	 difficult	
without	 clear	 empirical	 data.
32
	 A	 limited	 amount	 of	 administrative	 data	 is,	 however,	
available.
33
	Table	1	shows	the	total	amount	of	applications	for	legal	aid	made	in	judicial	review	
cases	 from	2006	 to	2017.	Table	2	 shows	data	 taken	 from	the	Administrative	Court	COINS	
database	on	how	many	may	 judicial	 reviews	are	 recorded	as	being	supported	by	 legal	aid	
from	2000	to	2016.	The	overall	upshot	which	can	be	taken	from	these	two	data	sets	is	that	
legal	aid	is	nowalso	more	difficult	to	secure	for	cases	with	a	clear	public	interest	dimension.	
	
Table	1:	total	amount	of	applications	for	legal	aid	made	in	judicial	review	cases	over	the	last	ten	years	
Year	 Granted	 Not	Granted	
2006-07	 5,085	 758	
2007-08	 4,925	 730	
2008-09	 5,605	 724	
2009-10	 6,589	 875	
2010-11	 5,484	 914	
2011-12	 5,491	 1,128	
2012-13	 6,298	 1,103	
2013-14	 5,313	 2,008	
2014-15	 3,718	 1,311	
                                                
29
	Hickman,	“Public	Law’s	Disgrace”.	
30
	Civil	Legal	Aid	(Remuneration)	(Amendment)(No	3)	Regulations	2014	(SI	2014/607).	
31
	R.	(on	the	application	of	Ben	Hoare	Bell	Solicitors	&	Ors)	v	The	Lord	Chancellor	[2015]	EWHC	523	(Admin);	The	
Civil	Legal	Aid	(Remuneration)	(Amendment)	Regulations	2015	(SI	2015/898).	
32
	Much	 helpful	 data	 is	 kept	 by	 the	 government.	Much	 of	 it	 is	 published	 but	much	 of	what	 is	 available	 on	
government	systems	may	be	genuinely	outside	of	the	provisions	of	FOIA.	
33
	This	was	made	available	via	an	FOIA	request	by	the	author,	see	FOIA	Request	No.	171020004.	
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2015-16	 3,842	 1,560	
2016-17	 3,131	 970	
	
Table	2:	amount	of	judicial	review	cases	recorded	as	being	supported	by	legal	aid	on	the	Administrative	
Court	COINS	database	
Year	 Number	of	judicial	reviews	 Number	of	judicial	reviews	with	legal	aid	 As	a	%	
2000	 4238	 1163	 27.44%	
2001	 4722	 1733	 36.70%	
2002	 5372	 1586	 29.52%	
2003	 5938	 1938	 32.64%	
2004	 4200	 913	 21.74%	
2005	 5356	 930	 17.36%	
2006	 6421	 1077	 16.77%	
2007	 6684	 921	 13.78%	
2008	 7093	 1024	 14.44%	
2009	 9098	 1440	 15.83%	
2010	 10553	 1340	 12.70%	
2011	 11360	 799	 7.03%	
2012	 12429	 1246	 10.02%	
2013	 15594	 933	 5.98%	
2014	 4065	 240	 5.90%	
2015	 4679	 205	 4.38%	
2016	 4300	 195	 4.53%	
	
	 Overall,	the	general	picture	of	judicial	review	funding	in	the	UK,	at	least	in	terms	of	
the	sources	of	funding	that	have	been	available	in	recent	years,	is	one	of	increasing	scarcity.	
Fees	are	still	high,	legal	aid	grants	are	decreasing,	and	other	kinds	of	agreements—such	as	
CFAs—are	far	from	ideal	in	judicial	review.	In	this	context,	PIL	finds	itself	in	a	new,	even	more	
hostile	 environment	 than	before;	 the	 key	 funding	 variables	 are	 shifting.	Certainly,	 various	
third-party	 funders—such	 as	 charitable	 trusts	 or	 the	 Equality	 and	 Human	 Rights	
Commission—still	sometimes	back	judicial	reviews,	but	the	overall	funding	landscape	remains	
more	baron	than	it	was	in	the	recent	past.
34
	
                                                
34
	The	longer	history	of	funding	for	judicial	reviews	is,	of	course,	a	more	complex	story.	
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Crowdfunding	and	Judicial	Review		
A	relatively	 recent	phenomenon	 is	 the	possibility	of	 raising	money	 for	 litigation	via	online	
crowdfunding	 platforms.	 Crowdfunding	 in	 general	 has	 risen	 in	 prominence	 across	 the	UK	
economy—a	 trend	 often	 attributed	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 banks	 and	 other	 traditional	 funding	
sources	to	meet	demand—and	the	crowdfunding	market	has	grown	massively	in	size,	seeing	
huge	year-on-year	growth.	In	2013,	£666	million	was	raised	through	crowdfunding	platforms,	
which	rose	to	£1.74	billion	and	£3.2	billion	in	2014	and	2015	respectively.
35
	A	review	by	Nesta	
adopted	 the	 view	 that	 crowdfunding	 is	 now	 a	 key	 aspect	 of	 the	 “alternative	 finance	
economy,”	and	an	industry	which	“is	quickly	becoming	an	important	part	of	the	UK	economy,”	
one	where	an	“innovative,	technology	led	approach	has	improved	access	to	finance	for	[small	
and	medium	enterprises]	and	seems	to	be	having	a	positive	impact	on	social	and	charitable	
enterprises.”
36
	The	move	toward	this	new	alternative	finance	industry	was	supported	by	the	
government,	and	so	was	 the	use	of	crowdfunding	specifically.	 In	2012,	 to	demonstrate	 its	
support,	 the	 Coalition	 Government	 invested	 £20	 million	 in	 businesses	 via	 crowdfunding	
platforms	and	made	a	further	£40	million	investment	in	2014.
37
	At	the	same	time,	there	have	
been	growing	concerns	about	the	general	regulation	of	crowdfunding	activities	and	increased	
regulation	is	likely	to	develop	in	the	coming	years.
38
		
In	the	litigation	context,	crowdfunding	is,	in	essence,	a	form	of	third	party	litigation	
funding	arrangement.	This	was	defined	by	Jackson	LJ	as	funding	by	a	“party	who	has	no	pre-
existing	interest	in	the	litigation,	usually	on	the	basis	that	(i)	the	funder	will	be	paid	out	of	the	
proceeds	of	any	amounts	recovered	as	a	consequence	of	the	litigation,	often	as	a	percentage	
                                                
35
	B.	Zhang,	P.	Baeck,	T.	Ziegler,	J.	Bone	and	K.	Garvey,	Pushing	Boundaries:	The	2015	UK	Alternative	Finance	
Industry	Report	(Nesta:	London,	2015).	
36
	Above	p.5.	
37
	Department	for	Business,	Innovation	&	Skills,	"New	£40	million	investment	by	British	Business	Bank	to	support	
£450million	 of	 lending	 to	 smaller	 businesses—Press"	 (25	 February	 2014),	
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-40-million-investment-by-british-business-bank-to-support-450-
million-of-lending-to-smaller-businesses	[Accessed	February	22,	2018].	
38
	 J.	 Armour	 and	 L.	 Enriques,	 “The	 Promise	 and	 Perils	 of	 Crowdfunding:	 Between	 Corporate	 Finance	 and	
Consumer	Contracts”	(2018)	81(1)	M.L.R.	51.	The	Financial	Conduct	Authority	are	also	now	taking	various	steps	
in	respect	of	crowdfunding	platforms.	For	instance,	they	consider	certain	forms	of	crowdfunding—loan-based	
crowdfunding	 and	 investment-based	 crowdfunding—as	 regulated	 activities	 under	 the	 Financial	 Services	 and	
Markets	Act	2000.	
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of	the	recovery	sum;	and	(ii)	the	funder	is	not	entitled	to	payment	should	the	claim	fail.”
39
	
Long	prohibited	under	the	ancient	principles
40
	of	barretry,	maintenance,	and	champerty,	the	
past	 century	 saw	a	 gradual	 liberalisation	on	 third-party	 funding	 for	 litigation.
41
	 Jackson	 LJ	
considered	 that	 third	 party	 funding	 is	 in	 principle	 “beneficial	 and	 should	 be	 supported,”	
because,	amongst	other	benefits,	it	“provides	an	additional	means	of	funding	litigation	and,	
for	some	parties,	the	only	means	of	funding	litigation	[and	thus]	promotes	access	to	justice.”
42
	
In	a	crowdfunding	arrangement,	online	donations	are	made	to	a	collective	pot.	The	pot	of	
funds	then	essentially	is	the	third-party	fund,	with	the	donors	the	funders.	A	distinction	can	
be	 drawn	 between	 “investment-based”	 crowdfunding	 models,	 where	 investors	 have	 a	
financial	 stake	 in	 a	 monetary	 claim,	 and	 “non-investment	 based”	 crowdfunding	 models,	
where	the	investors’	reward	is	non-monetary	or	non-existent.
	43
		
Two	organisations	in	the	UK	currently	offer	bespoke	crowdfunding	services	for	judicial	
review	 claims	 and	 are	 particularly	 prominent:	 CrowdJustice	 and	 the	 Good	 Law	 Project.	
CrowdJustice	 offers	 a	 platform	 for	 case	 owners	 (those	 seeking	 funding)	 to	 publicise	 and	
fundraise	for	a	prospective	case.	Case	owners,	with	support	 from	CrowdJustice,	develop	a	
webpage	setting	out	details	of	the	case	for	which	funding	is	sought,	a	target	amount,	and	a	
deadline	 for	 raising	 it.	 The	 page	 is	 typically	 publicised	 through	 social	 media	 and	 online	
donations	are	accepted.	If	the	target	is	met,	then	funds	are	transferred	into	the	case	owner’s	
solicitors’	client	account.	CrowdJustice	takes	a	6%	“platform	fee,”	plus	VAT,	from	the	overall	
total	raised.	The	payment	process	also	has	a	charge	of	1.7%	plus	20p	per	pledge.	If	the	case	
owner’s	target	is	not	met,	CrowdJustice	do	not	take	a	fee,	pledges	are	cancelled,	and	backers’	
cards	are	not	charged.	If	the	case	proceeds,	any	funds	that	are	unused	at	the	conclusion	of	
the	case	are	returned	by	the	solicitors	to	CrowdJustice.	The	case	owner	can	elect	to	put	such	
unused	funds	towards	another	case	on	CrowdJustice,	or	failing	that,	they	are	donated	to	the	
Access	to	Justice	Foundation.	Those	who	donate	over	£1,000	are	given	the	option	of	a	pro	
                                                
39
	Lord	Justice	Jackson,	Review	of	Civil	Costs:	Final	Report	(2009),	p.xv.	However,	Jackson	LJ	recognised	that	third	
party	funding	is	“not	usually	feasible	where	non-monetary	relief,	such	as	an	injunction	or	declaration,	is	the	main	
remedy	sought.”	
40
	M.	Radin,	‘Maintenance	by	Champerty’	(1935)	24	California	Law	Review	48,	49;	Giles	v	Thompson	[1994]	1	
AC	142,	p.153	(Lord	Mustill).	
41
	For	an	overview,	see	Lord	Neuberger,	“From	Barretry,	Maintenance	and	Champerty	to	Litigation	Funding”	
(Harbour	Litigation	Funding	Lecture,	2013).	
42
	Above	Ch.11,	para.1.2.		
43
	Perry,	“Crowdfunding	Civil	Justice”	(2018)	B.C.L.R.	(forthcoming).	
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rata	 refund.	 CrowdJustice	 does	 not	 offer	 any	 legal	 advice.	 All	 information	 about	 the	 case	
comes	from	the	case	owners	and	their	lawyers.		
The	Good	Law	Project	was	founded	by	its	Director,	Jolyon	Maugham	QC—a	successful	
tax	 barrister.	 It	 is	 not	 itself	 a	 crowdfunding	 platform—it	 uses	 CrowdJustice—but	
crowdfunding	is	a	key	part	of	its	operation.	It	is	an	expressly	political	project,	whose	aims	are	
to	use	litigation	to	drive	the	demand	for	change.	It	has	particular	areas	of	interest,	including	
tax,	workers’	rights,	and	Brexit.	The	general	way	in	which	the	Good	Law	Project	works	was	set	
out	in	a	lecture	by	its	Director.
44
	In	essence,	the	Director	seeks	potential	cases	which	meet	
the	 Project’s	 case	 selection	 criteria,	 secures	 pro	 bono	 advice	 from	 counsel,	 and	 seeks	
solicitors	and	counsel	willing	to	act	on	terms	consistent	with	the	crowdfunding	exercise	at	
Government	lawyer	rates,	and	then	crowdfunds	at	the	letter	before	claim	stage.	The	first	case	
the	Good	Law	Project	related	to	the	argument	ultimately	decided	by	the	Supreme	Court	in	
Miller.
45
	After	the	Article	50	argument	was	floated	in	an	online	blog,	Maugham	crowdfunded	
initial	advice	(though		this	effort	was	one	of	multiple	efforts	and	the	Good	Law	Project	did	not	
take	part	in	the	litigation).
46
	Since	then,	it	has	crowdfunded	a	challenge	to	Uber’s	alleged	VAT	
avoidance	 (valued	 at	 around	 £1bn)	 and	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 Electoral	 Commission’s	
investigation	 into	 Vote	 Leave’s	 spending	 returns,	 the	 latter	 arguing	 that	 the	 Electoral	
Commission’s	investigation	applied	the	wrong	test	of	law	and	was	inadequate	on	the	facts.		
Both	 CrowdJustice	 and	 the	 Good	 Law	 Project	 have	 taken	 a	 different	 approach	 to	
vetting	 prospective	 claims,	 to	 try	 to	 ensure	 that	 they	 are	 supporting	 meritorious	 cases.	
CrowdJustice	 requires	 that	 every	 individual	or	 group	 taking	a	 case	either	have	a	qualified	
solicitor	or	barrister	who	has	been	instructed,	or	that	the	case	is	being	taken	by	a	non-profit,	
and	then	leaves	it	to	“campaign”	to	persuade	donors	of	the	merit	of	the	case.	The	Good	Law	
Project	uses	the	resources	of	its	Director	for	this	purpose,	which	places	a	limit	on	the	number	
of	cases	it	can	support.		
It	is	important	to	note	that	those	engaged	with	crowdfunding	judicial	reviews	are	a	
much	more	diverse	group	than	the	two	organisations	highlighted	here.	Many	charities,	for	
                                                
44
	J.	Maugham	QC,	“The	Lawyer	as	Political	Actor”	(Annual	Queen	Mary	University	of	London	Law	and	Society	
Lecture,	2017).	
45
	R	(Miller)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union	[2017]	UKSC	5;	[2017]	2	W.L.R.	583.	
46
	 The	 legal	 argument	 was	 outlined	 in	 N.	 Barber,	 T.	 Hickman	 and	 J.	 King,	 “Pulling	 the	 Article	 50	 ‘Trigger’:	
Parliament’s	 Indispensable	 Role”	 (June	 27	 2016)	 UK	 Constitutional	 Law	 Blog,	
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-
trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/	[Accessed	February	22,	2018].	
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instance,	 who	 bring	 litigation	 to	 pursue	 their	 aims	 rely	 upon	 crowdfunding.	 So	 too	 do	
individuals	lacking	sufficient	means	to	bring	a	case.	However,	the	crowdfunding	model	is	open	
to	use	by	a	wide	variety	of	actors	and	therefore	potentially	abuse	of	various	kinds	by	both	the	
malevolent	or	misguided.	There	have	been	no	major	scandals	yet	that	relate	to	crowdfunded	
litigation,	 but	 there	 are	 anecdotal	 reports	 of	 dubious	 crowdfunding	 propositions	 being	
circulated	and	much	of	crowdfunding	activity,	despite	being	online,	may	not	be	particularly	
visible.
47
	 The	 landscape	 being	 effectively	 devoid	 of	 tailored	 regulation	 does	 not	 assist	 in	
ensuring	problems	are	detected.	At	present,	the	crowdfunding	“community”	is	an	ambiguous	
entity.		
One	example	of	a	crowdfunded	judicial	review	in	the	UK	is	the	junior	doctors’	case.
48
	
The	claimant	group,	Justice	for	Health,	argued	that	a	new	contract	imposed	by	the	Secretary	
of	State	was	“unsafe	and	unsustainable”	and	that	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Health—Jeremy	
Hunt	MP—did	not	have	the	legal	power	to	impose	it.		Put	simply,	the	new	contract	changed	
the	 way	 doctors	 were	 to	 be	 reimbursed	 for	 weekend	 working.	 Instead	 of	 Saturdays	 and	
Sundays	being	divided	up	between	“normal”	and	“unsocial”	hours,	supplements	were	to	be	
paid	which	depended	on	how	many	weekends	a	doctor	works.	Health	ministers	argued	that	
the	contract	was	necessary	to	 improve	medical	cover	at	weekends.
49
	The	argument	 led	to	
various	strikes	by	 junior	doctors	and	 led	to	the	first	all-out	strike	 in	NHS	history.	Green	J.,	
sitting	 in	 the	 High	 Court,	 concluded	 that	Mr.	 Hunt	 had	 acted	 “squarely”	 within	 his	 legal	
powers.	The	claimants	also	argued	that	Mr	Hunt’s	approach	lacked	clarity	and	transparency,	
and	that	it	was	irrational	to	contend	that	imposing	the	contract	would	improve	weekend	care.	
Green	 J.	 rejected	 all	 of	 these	 arguments,	 finding	 that	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 was	 legally	
entitled	to	adopt	the	view	that	changing	staffing	at	weekends	would	have	“some,	material”	
impact	on	medical	cover.	What	is	significant	for	the	purposes	of	this	article	is	that	the	claimant	
in	this	case,	Justice	for	Health,	was	a	company	formed	of	junior	doctors	who	were	“directly	
affected	 by	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 contract.”
50
	 They	 raised	 money—£300,000—via	
CrowdJustice,	based	on	donations	by	more	than	5,000	donors.
51
	The	litigation	was	led	by	an	
                                                
47
	This	area	is	ripe	for	further	investigation.	
48
	Justice	for	Health	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Health	[2016]	EWHC	2338;	[2016]	Med.	L.R.	599.	
49
	There	were	disputes	about	the	evidence	used	by	the	government	to	support	its	case.	
50
	Justice	for	Health	[2016]	EWHC	2338;	[2016]	Med.	L.R.	599	[15].	
51
	C.	Dyer,	“Junior	doctors'	High	Court	challenge	to	Jeremy	Hunt”	(13	September	2016)	British	Medical	Journal,	
http://www.bmj.com/content/354/bmj.i4975	[Accessed	February	22,	2018].	
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established	public	law	firm.	Green	J.	observed	that	the	case	was	“financed	by	a	large	number	
of	individuals	who	have	contributed	on	a	crowd-funding	basis	all	of	whom	it	is	said	oppose	
the	introduction	of	the	new	contract”	and	how	support	had	been	“forthcoming	from	many	
sources,	including	senior	members	of	the	medical	profession.”
52
	Early	on	in	the	case,	a	cap	
was	placed	on	how	much	costs	could	be	recovered.
53
	It	is	unclear	whether	this	case—though	
it	ultimately	failed—would	have	been	possible	without	crowdfunding.	If	it	had	succeeded,	the	
reform	would	have	essentially	been	crowdfunded.		
Another	 example	 of	 a	 case	 supported	 by	 crowdfunding—a	 less	 well-managed	
instance—is	Webster.
54
	This	case	formed	part	of	a	string	of	cases,	brought	after	the	Miller	
litigation,	which	sought	to	challenge	the	notice	of	withdrawal	sent	by	the	UK	to	the	EU.	After	
the	claim	was	brought	considerably	out	of	time,	permission	was	rejected	on	the	papers	by	
Supperstone	J	as	 ‘unarguable.’	The	claimants	renewed	their	application	at	an	oral	renewal	
hearing.	The	second	time	around,	Gross	LJ	and	Green	J	found	the	application	to	be	totally	
without	merit:	“[p]ut	bluntly,	the	debate	which	the	claimant	seeks	to	promote	belongs	firmly	
in	the	political	arena,	not	the	courts.”
55
	Remarkably,	despite	the	merits	of	the	case	always	
being	weak,	the	underlying	crowdfunding	campaign	raised	£190,000.	It	was	also	a	campaign	
not	 conducted	 with	 much	 transparency—unlike	 some	 other	 examples	 of	 successful	
crowdfunding,	details	of	the	arguments	to	be	put	and	the	key	litigation	documents	were	not	
made	public.		
	 A	word	of	warning	about	examples	such	as	the	two	outlined	above	is	needed.	Just	as	
there	are	examples	of	successful	crowdfunding	attempts,	there	are	many	more	examples	of	
cases	 that	 gather	 hardly	 any	 support.	 In	 many	 respects,	 these	 failed	 attempts	 are	 more	
interesting	than	the	headline-grabbing	cases	as	they	may	expose	some	of	the	ground-level	
funding	gaps	in	the	justice	system	and,	more	broadly,	failures	of	the	state.	These	are	not	the	
cases,	however,	that	get	much	attention	in	the	discussion	around	crowdfunding.	Great	care	
must	 be	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	 focus	 is	 now	 directed	 only	 on	 high-profile,	 successful	
crowdfunding	campaigns	which	may,	in	reality,	the	be	exception	to	the	usual	result.	
                                                
52
	Justice	for	Health	[2016]	EWHC	2338;	[2016]	Med.	L.R.	599	[15].	
53
	Cost	capping	was	agreed	to	by	the	Secretary	of	State.	Cost	capping	received	seminal	judicial	consideration	by	
the	Court	of	Appeal	in	R	(Corner	House	Research)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Trade	and	Industry	[2005]	EWCA	Civ	
192;	[2005]	1	W.L.R.	2600.	See	further:	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s.88.	
54
	R	(Webster)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	EU	[2018]	EWHC	1543	(Admin).	
55
	Above	[10];	[24].	
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	 Finally,	it	should	be	note	that	cost	capping	appears	to	be	]	an	important	part	of	the	
evolving	 practice	 around	 crowdfunding.	 Costs	 capping	 orders	 (and	 their	 judge-made	
predecessors,	 protective	 costs	 orders)	 are	 sought	 and	 made	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 in	 the	
proceedings,	 conferring	 costs	 protection	 on	 a	 party	 regardless	 of	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	
proceedings.
56
	The	law	relating	to	protective	costs	orders	was	codified,	with	some	changes,	
in	 the	Criminal	 Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015,	which	 introduced	costs	 capping	orders.
57
	 The	
conditions	that	have	to	be	met	before	the	court	can	make	a	costs	capping	order	are	that:	
permission	 to	 apply	 for	 judicial	 review	 has	 been	 granted;	 the	 court	 is	 satisfied	 that	 the	
proceedings	are	public	interest	proceedings;	and	the	court	is	satisfied	that,	without	a	costs	
capping	 order,	 the	 applicant	 would	 be	 acting	 reasonably	 by	 withdrawing	 or	 ceasing	 to	
participate	in	the	proceedings.	Proceedings	are	considered	“public	interest	proceedings”	only	
if:	an	issue	that	is	the	subject	of	the	proceedings	is	of	general	public	importance;	the	public	
interest	 requires	 the	 issue	 to	 be	 resolved;	 and	 the	 proceedings	 are	 likely	 to	 provide	 an	
appropriate	means	of	resolving	it.	A	number	of	factors	must	be	taken	into	account	by	judges	
considering	an	application,	 including:	the	number	of	people	 likely	to	be	directly	affected	if	
relief	is	granted	to	the	applicant	for	judicial	review;	how	significant	the	effect	on	those	people	
is	likely	to	be;	and	whether	the	proceedings	involve	consideration	of	a	point	of	law	of	general	
public	importance.
58
	If	an	order	is	made,	a	reciprocal	cap	must	also	be	imposed,	restricting	
the	costs	the	beneficiary	of	the	costs	capping	order	 is	able	to	recover.
59
	Furthermore,	 it	 is	
required	 that	 any	 application	 for	 a	 costs	 capping	 order	 is	 supported	 by	 evidence	 of	 the	
applicant's	 financial	 resources,	 including	 “the	 financial	 resources	 of	 the	 parties	 to	 the	
proceedings,	including	the	financial	resources	of	any	person	who	provides,	or	may	provide,	
financial	support	to	the	parties.”
60
	Cost	capping	may	be	helpful	to	crowdfunders	of	limited	
means	 and	 its	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 case	 that	 crowdfunded	 claimants	 do	 seek	 such	 orders	
routinely.	 Recently,	 Cheema-Grubb	 J	 granted	 a	 cost	 capping	 order	 for	 a	 judicial	 review	
brought	by	five	claimants,	including	Professor	Stephen	Hawking,	challenging	the	lawfulness	
                                                
56
	R	(Corner	House	Research)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Trade	and	Industry	[2005]	1	W.L.R.	2600.	
57
	Sections	88-90,	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015.	A	Costs	Capping	Order	is	defined	in	section	88(2)	as	‘an	
order	limiting	or	removing	the	liability	of	a	party	to	judicial	review	proceedings	to	pay	another	party’s	costs	in	
connection	with	any	stage	of	the	proceedings.’	
58
	Section	88(8),	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015.	
59
	Section	89(2),	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015.	
60
	Section	89(1)(a),	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015.	
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of	the	government’s	policy	to	create	accountable	care	organisations.
61
	That	particular	ruling	
demonstrated	a	positive	judicial	attitude	to	crowdfunded	claims	in	respect	of	cost	capping	
orders.	Cheema-Grubb	J	observed	that	where	a	judicial	review	application	is	crowdfunded,	
the	 public	 is	 funding	 both	 sides:	 the	 government	 by	 tax	 payers	 and	 the	 claimants	 by	
crowdfunding.	It	was	also	noted	that	crowdfunding	is	inherently	uncertain	and	the	certainty	
provided	by	a	costs	capping	order	was	helpful	to	enable	individuals	to	take	a	public	interest	
case	forward.	Cheema-Grubb	J	ordered	a	cap	of	£160,000	in	total	for	defendants’	costs	(two	
were	involved)	and	a	reciprocal	cap	of	£115,000	in	respect	of	the	claimant’s	costs.	This	was	
against	a	backdrop	of	 the	 claimants	 raising	nearly	£265,000	via	 crowdfunding	and	private	
donations,	meaning	the	ruling	enabled	relatively	substantial	funds	to	meet	the	costs	of	the	
claimants’	 lawyers.	 We	 are,	 with	 cases	 such	 as	 this,	 witnessing	 the	 start	 of	 practices	
developing	and	 little	 is	certain,	but	 it	 is	 likely	that	applications	for	cost	capping	orders	are	
likely	to	be	a	common	feature	of	crowdfunding	judicial	review	litigation	in	the	coming	years.	
	
Solving	the	Resource	Problem	through	Crowdfunding?	
Connecting	the	points	set	out	above,	an	important	question	arises:	is	crowdfunding	a	possible	
answer	to	the	issue	of	lack	of	resources	in	the	context	of	PIL?	Can	it,	in	other	words,	provide	
new	fuel	for	reform	through	PIL?	It	is	argued	here	that	crowdfunding	can—in	certain	cases—
solve	 the	 resource	 dilemma.	 There	 are,	 however,	 many	 risks	 that	 are	 attached	 to	
crowdfunding	in	this	context.	My	aim	in	this	part	of	the	article	is,	therefore,	to	elaborate	the	
main	possible	benefits	and	risks.
62
		
	 At	 the	 outset,	 it	 must	 be	 observed	 that	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 crowdfunding	 models	 do	
possesses	 the	potential	 to	quickly	 raise	 the	 sums	 required	 for	 judicial	 reviews.	 The	 junior	
doctors	case	is	a	good	example	of	this,	raising	over	£300,000.	But	such	success	is,	of	course,	
not	guaranteed	and	failed	attempts	appear	to	be	much	more	common.
63
	The	proposed	case	
ultimately	needs	to	find	favour	with	some	willing	donors.	Unless	an	issue	in	the	proposed	case	
already	has	a	 strong	place	within	 the	public	 consciousness,	gains	media	 traction,	or	has	a	
specialist	(and	preferably	not	poor)	set	of	supporters,	it	may	be	the	case	that	some	level	of	
                                                
61
	 R.	 (on	 the	 application	 of	 Hawking)	 v	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Health	 and	 Social	 Care	 (22	 February	 2018,	
unreported).	A	costs	cap	was	initially	refused	by	Mr	Justice	Peter	Walker,	when	he	granted	permission. 
62
	 The	 analysis	 provided	 in	 this	 section—except	where	 explicitly	 stated—is	 general	 and	 not	 targeted	 at	 any	
particular	platform	or	organisation.	
63
	There	is	no	clear	data	published	on	this.	
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investment	is	needed	to	promote	donations	via	the	crowdfunding	platform.	Put	simply,	it	may	
cost	money	to	drum	up	a	crowd	in	the	first	place.	In	practice,	this	could	prove	to	be	a	serious	
barrier	 to	 crowdfunding	 having	 wide-ranging	 impact	 on	 PIL.	 It	 could	 also	 have	 particular	
implications	for	the	viability	of	crowdfunding	for	genuinely	unpopular	claimants	brining	public	
law	challenges.		
There	are	some	tough	questions	around	the	practical	management	of	crowdfunding,	
which	gives	rise	to	some	ethical	quandaries.	First,	when	should	the	funding	be	sought?	Too	
early,	 and	 the	 action	 seems	 speculative.	 Too	 late,	 and	 delays—which	 can	 be	 fatal	 in	 the	
judicial	review	context—may	arise.	Second,	how	much	should	be	crowdfunded	at	each	stage?	
This	involves	determining	what	amount	is	required	and	when.	Some	crowdfunding	campaigns	
seize	upon	any	 initial	“buzz”	and	raise	as	much	as	possible	at	 the	start.	This	may	be	good	
litigation	strategy	in	many	respects,	but	it	also	has	problems.	A	reputation	may	be	damaged	
by	having	to	return	funds	(something	which	may	not	be	logistically	easy).	There	may	also	be	
a	“useful	discipline”	 in	“putting	yourself	 in	a	position	where	you	have	to	make	an	ongoing	
case	for	people	to	support	the	litigation.”
64
	Third,	there	is	the	issue	of	what	crowdfunding	is	
sought	for,	i.e.	what	should	be	pitched	to	the	public.	Some	crowdfunding	attempts	only	give	
very	board	overviews	of	the	case	they	intend	to	bring.	At	the	same	time,	the	“crowd”	will	be	
a	section	of	the	public	and	a	public-facing	pitch	will	be	necessary.	Furthermore,	cases	develop	
and	change	when,	for	instance,	more	information	is	disclosed	during	the	course	of	litigation;	
while	an	accurate	 label	may	be	printed	when	funds	are	sought,	 there	 is	a	chance	that	the	
contents	of	the	tin	may	change.		
There	 is	 also	 the	 question	 of	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 crowdfunding	 arrangement,	 and	
particularly	the	operation	of	sections	85	and	86	of	the	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015.	
Section	85(1)	provides	that	no	application	for	judicial	review	will	be	granted	leave	unless	the	
applicant	has	“provided	the	court	with	any	information	about	the	financing	of	the	application	
that	is	specified	in	rules	of	court	for	the	purposes	of	this	paragraph.”
65
	The	clear	effect	of	this	
provision	is	to	eliminate	the	discretion	of	the	High	Court	to	grant	permission	unless	certain	
financial	information	is	provided.	Section	86	places	a	requirement	on	the	Court	to	have	regard	
to	 information	 provided	 under	 section	 85	when	 it	 is	 “determining	 by	whom	and	 to	what	
                                                
64
	J.	Maugham	QC,	“The	Lawyer	as	Political	Actor”	(Annual	Queen	Mary	University	of	London	Law	and	Society	
Lecture,	2017).	
65
	This	amends	the	Senior	Courts	Act	1981	s31(3).	
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extent	costs	of	and	incidental	to	judicial	review	proceedings	are	to	be	paid.”
66
	The	court	must	
“consider	 whether	 to	 order	 costs	 to	 be	 paid	 by	 a	 person,	 other	 the	 proceedings,	 who	 is	
identified	 in	 [the	 information	 referred	 to	 in	 section	 86(3)]	 as	 someone	 who	 is	 providing	
financial	support	for	the	purposes	of	the	proceedings	or	is	likely	or	able	to	do	so.”
67
	Sections	
85	 and	 86	 sections	 are	 not	 yet	 in	 force,	 but	 are	 alluded	 to	 in	 CrowdJustice’s	 terms	 and	
conditions,	under	the	heading	“Risks	of	Funding	Litigation”:	
	
“In	 our	 view	UK	 case	 law	 indicates	 that	 pure	 funders	 –	 Backers	who	don’t	 have	 a	
personal	 interest	 in	 the	Case,	 don't	 stand	 to	benefit	 from	 it	 and	don’t	 control	 the	
course	of	the	Case	–	will	not	typically	have	any	liability	beyond	their	initial	Pledge…We	
make	no	warranties	or	representations	as	to	costs	or	other	risks	of	donating	to	any	
particular	Case…	New	legislation	that	came	into	effect	in	the	UK	in	April	2015	indicates	
that	in	judicial	review	cases,	people	who	donate	over	a	certain	amount	may	have	to	
be	 identified	 to	 the	courts.	That	amount	has	been	set	at	£3,000.	This	 requirement	
could	expose	backers	who	give	over	£3,000	to	judicial	reviews	in	certain	instances	to	
further	costs	risks.	The	requirement	brought	in	by	this	legislation	will	exist	whether	
you	donate	to	a	case	online	or	offline.”	
	
In	addition,	it	is	stipulated	that	backers	“acknowledge	and	agree	that	[they]	do	not	have,	and	
[their]	 contribution	 (whether	 financial	 or	 otherwise)	 does	 not	 entitle	 [them]	 to	 have,	 any	
rights	in	or	to	any	Case,	including	any	ownership,	control	or	rights	to	advise	on	the	conduct	
or	legal	strategy	of	a	Case.”	The	purpose	of	this	clause	appears	to	be	to	minimise	the	risk	that	
backers	 are	 held	 liable	 for	 in	 costs	 orders,	 since	 the	 exercise	 of	 some	 control	 over	 case	
management	is	one	of	the	features	that	distinguishes	a	non-party	who	may	be	subject	to	a	
non-party	costs	order,	from	a	pure	funder	(who	is	not	normally	so	subject).	If	crowdfunding	
grows	in	this	sphere	and	the	sections	are	brought	into	force,	the	extent	to	which	donors	are	
exposed	to	court	orders	may	become	a	key	factor	in	determining	the	volume	of	donations	
and	their	amount,	and	will	bring	further	ethical	considerations	into	play.	
Looking	more	broadly,	it	is	difficult	to	see	at	what	point	a	crowdfunding	project	will	
be	 considered	authentic.	 In	other	words,	how	many	donors	are	needed	 for	 there	 to	be	a	
                                                
66
	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s86(1).	
67
	Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015	s86(3).	
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genuine	 “crowd”	 and	 not	 just	 a	 few	 private	 backers?	 One	 of	 the	main	 distinctions	 often	
observed	between	crowdfunding	and	other	types	of	online	donation	methods	is	that,	with	
crowdfunding,	donors	become	aware	of	each	other	through	the	“campaign.”	This,	it	has	been	
argued,	produces	a	“collective	energy”	and	has	the	effect	of	informing	donors.
68
	The	junior	
doctors	case,	for	instance,	attracted	5,000	donors.
69
	This	could	be	said	to	stand	as	evidence	
of	broad-based	participation—a	good	number	of	the	community	was	willing	to	put	money	to	
the	cause	in	the	case.	This	could	allow	cases	to	make	claims	to	some	kind	of	popular	approval.	
However,	where	the	number	of	donors	is	limited	or	a	crowdfunding	attempt	fails,	that	could	
stand	as	evidence	 that	 the	crowdfunding	attempt	 is	either	a	gimmick	or	 lacks	 community	
support.
70
	The	suggestion	that	popularity	matters	to	whether	a	case	is	brought	or	not	also	sits	
particularly	uncomfortably	with	the	nature	of	public	law	and	judicial	review,	which	is	often	
observed	to	provide—at	least	in	part—the	function	of	protecting	the	individual	and	often	that	
protection	is	from	majority	or	popular	views.	It	would	certainly	rub	up	against	much	liberal	
constitutional	 thought	 if	 the	 ability	 to	 fundraise	 from	 the	 community	 became	 somehow	
conflated	with	whether	there	was	a	public	interest	in	a	case	being	brought.
71
		
Another	 important	 question	 is	 how	 the	 distinction	 between	 “investment-based”	
crowdfunding	models,	where	investors	have	a	financial	stake	in	a	monetary	claim,	and	“non-
investment	based”	crowdfunding	models,	where	the	 investors’	reward	 is	non-monetary	or	
intangible	is	handled.
72
	Perry	argues	that	that	use	of	the	former	should	be	encouraged,	but	
the	latter	constrained.	This	is	because	in	investment-based	crowdfunding	models,	investors	
have	an	 interest	 in	 the	proper	evaluation	of	 the	merits	of	a	claim,	so	 the	 funding	process	
facilitates	claims	that	would	not	otherwise	be	brought	but	minimises	the	risk	that	the	claims	
will	be	unmeritorious.	In	non-investment	based	crowdfunding	models,	Perry	concludes	that	
the	lack	of	any	financial	interest	in	a	claim	reduces	the	incentive	for	investors	to	vet	the	merits	
of	the	case,	legal	or	otherwise	(indeed,	investors	in	this	context	may	be	better	understood	as	
“donors”	 or	 “backers”).	 Perry	 therefore	 recommends	 that	 in	 non-investment	 based	
crowdfunding	models,	claims	should	be	subject	to	a	professional	vetting	process	to	minimise	
                                                
68
	R.	Davies,	Civic	Crowdfunding:	Participatory	Communities,	Entrepreneurs	and	the	Political	Economy	of	Place	
(Master	of	Science	Thesis,	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology,	2014),	p.26.	
69
	C.	Dyer,	“Junior	doctors'	High	Court	challenge	to	Jeremy	Hunt”.	
70
	This,	of	course,	may	not	be	fair,	but	it	is	a	possibility.	
71
	The	specific	tenets	that	may	be	in	tension	include	the	notion	that	the	law	can	protect	individuals	from	the	
“tyranny	of	the	majority”	and	the	responsiveness	of	democratic	politics	to	short-term	interests	etc.	
72
	Perry,	“Crowdfunding	Civil	Justice”	(2018)	B.C.L.R.	(forthcoming).	
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the	 risk	 of	 generating	 unmeritorious	 claims.	 Different	 organisations	 involved	 with	
crowdfunding	take	different	approaches	to	vetting.	As	outlined	above,	CrowdJustice	requires	
that	every	individual	or	group	taking	a	case	either	have	a	qualified	solicitor	or	barrister	who	
has	been	instructed,	or	that	the	case	is	being	taken	by	a	non-profit,	The	Good	Law	Project	
uses	the	resources	of	 its	Director	for	this	purpose.	 It	 is	unclear	what	vetting	standards	are	
operating	across	the	crowdfunding	“community”	as	a	whole.	
Generally	 speaking,	 the	 possible	 change	 in	 the	 vetting	 processes	 used	 raises	 the	
prospect	of	 a	 very	different	breed	of	 PIL	 to	 that	which	 the	UK	 is	 familiar	with,	which	 are	
typically	 brought	 by	 organisations	 with	 expertise	 in	 public	 law	 litigation	 (e.g.	 Liberty	 or	
JUSTICE)	 or	 some	 specialist	 policy	 area	 (e.g.	 Greenpeace).	 Traditionally,	 litigation—being	
perceived	as	complex	and	risky—has	been	approached	carefully	by	many	organisations.	One	
upshot	is	that	the	same	few	organisations	appear	again	and	again	on	the	headnotes	of	judicial	
reviews—in	 recent	 history,	 UK	 public	 interest	 judicial	 reviews	 have	 often	 involved	
organisations	with	similar	bundles	of	core	beliefs.
73
	As	Rawlings	observes:	“[a]s	chief	repeat	
players,	Liberty	and	JUSTICE	may	not	yet	have	been	assigned	offices	in	the…	Supreme	Court	
building	but	they	might	as	well	be.”
74
	The	implications	of	crowdfunding	in	this	respect	may	
be	diverse.	One	possible	outcome	 is	 that	we	 could	 see	more	PIL.	Of	 course,	 anyone	with	
money	could	have	always	set	up	some	kind	of	organisation	or	simply	brought	cases.
75
	But	
crowdfunding	potentially	opens	up	this	possibility	to	those	causes	where	concentrated	funds	
have	not	been	readily	available	previously,	and	it	could	also	be	seen	as	removing	the	barrier	
of	those	with	funds	having	to	put	their	own	money	in.		
Crowdfunding	could	also	see	less	experienced	participants	coming	to	the	PIL	scene.	
Jolyon	Maugham	QC—though	probably	considered	part	of	a	liberal,	metropolitan	elite	often	
associated	with	PIL	in	the	UK—is	a	good	example	of	the	possibility	of	crowdfunding	opening-
up	who	is	involved	in	PIL.	No	doubt,	Maugham	has	the	credentials	of	a	well-regarded	tax	silk.	
But	 tax	 law	 is	 a	 very	 different	 beast	 to	 public	 interest	 judicial	 review.	 This	 is	 something	
Maugham	freely	admits,	acknowledging	that	“organisations	in	the	UK	that	have	a	far	longer	
history	of	engagement	in	the	cause	lawyering	field”	than	himself	and	that	this	means,	in	his	
                                                
73
	These	are	often	observed	to	be	“left-of-centre”	or	“liberal.”	
74
	Rawlings,	“Modelling	Judicial	Review”	(2008)	61(1)	CLP	95,	p.103.	
75
	The	spread-betting	tycoon	Stuart	Wheeler,	who	challenged	the	UK’s	ratification	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty,	is	a	good	
example,	see:	R	(Wheeler)	v	Office	of	the	Prime	Minister	[2008]	EWHC	1409	(Admin);	[2008]	A.C.D.	70.	
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own	words,	that	he	suffers	the	“advantages	and	suffer	the	consequences	of	who	[he	is].”
76
	
This	is	not	to	say	that	Mr.	Maugham	is	not	suited	to	his	new	vocation,	but	demonstrates	how	
resources	 from	 crowdfunding	 can	 lead	 to	 an	 opening	 up	 of	 who	 can	 lead	 PIL.	 These	
organisations,	 when	 considering	 and	 conducting	 PIL,	 have	 generally	 been	 responsive	 to	
internal	 checks,	 governance	 systems	 (such	 as	 boards	 of	 trustees),	 and	 duties	 to	 wider	
membership.	While	such	organisations	can	of	course	use	crowdfunding,	the	platform	offered	
by	crowdfunding	allows	for	individual	lawyers	and	campaigners	to	transcend	the	traditional	
model	of	PIL.	The	“causes”	operating	beyond	such	litigation	may	therefore	become	diversified	
and,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 traditional	 organisational	 structure,	 transfer	 more	 power	 to	 the	
individuals	 bringing	 these	 cases	 and	 their	 lawyers.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 is	 also	 the	
possibility	that	the	“craft”	of	PIL—knowing	when	to	bring	a	case,	knowing	when	to	appeal,	
knowing	when	to	give	up	etc.—may	be	diluted.	It	may	be	said	that,	ultimately,	vetting	is	done	
by	the	donors.	After	all,	“if	you	are	asking	people	to	dip	their	hands	into	their	pockets	to	fund	
a	case	you	need	to	be	able	to	justify	that	decision	to	yourself	–	and	to	them.”
77
	But,	again,	
this	is	a	departure	from	conventional	vetting	norms—donors	are	a	very	different	group	than	
staff	at	civil	society	organisations.		
There	is	also	the	issue	of	how	the	government	may	respond	to	any	increased	role	for	
crowdfunding	in	PIL.
78
	If	crowdfunding	(and	other	private	funding	methods)	can	be	effective	
in	partially	filling	the	resource	gap,	government	may	take	this	an	indicator	that	public	funds	
are	not	necessary.
79
	It	has	been	argued	that	the	increased	efforts	of	the	pro	bono	community	
in	the	wake	of	legal	aid	reforms	stopped	the	reforms	from	failing	outright,	and	that	this	pro	
bono	 work	 ultimately	 supports	 an	 ill-designed	 system	 through	 good	 deeds.	 If	 there	 are	
crowdfunding	successes,	governments	in	the	future	might	choose	to	lean	on	such	“successes”	
to	prompt	otherwise	 restrictive	 reform	 in	 the	area.	There	 is,	 to	be	clear,	not	an	ounce	of	
systematic	evidence	that	crowdfunding	somehow	fills	the	gap	left	by	recent	reductions	in	the	
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availability	of	legal	aid.	
More	broadly,	how	government	may	respond	to	poorly-managed	PIL,	or	simply	to	a	
possible	increase	of	activity	in	PIL,	due	to	crowdfunding	is	an	important	question.	Braibant,	in	
a	seminal	article,	outlined	three	main	strategies	that	government	bodies	could	use	to	avoid	
implementing	 judgments:	they	could	delay,	e.g.	through	appeals;	they	could	simply	retake	
procedurally	flawed	decision;	or	they	could	legislate.
80
	Harlow	added	a	fourth	possibility,	that	
“government	 would	 simply	 disobey.”
81
	 Harlow	 and	 Rawlings	 further	 highlighted	 how	
government	may	react	by	taking	pre-emptive	actions	to	curb	further	litigation,	which	they	call	
“clamping	down.”
82
	This	is	a	“process”	that	involves	“structural	or	procedural	change	to	the	
judicial	review	process	or,	put	differently,	procedural	constraint	designed	to	blunt	substantive	
legal	action.”	In	Pressure	Through	Law,	Harlow	and	Rawlings	also	make	clear	that	pre-emptive	
“clamping	 down”	 does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 directed	 at	 the	 judiciary	 but	 can	 be	 aimed	 at	
discouraging	 particular	 claimants	 or	 groups.	 In	 that	 text—published	 in	 1992—it	 was	
suggested	that	the	UK	government	might	move	to	clamp	down	on	judicial	review.	Among	the	
possibilities	discussed	then	were:	direct	steps	to	exclude	claims,	e.g.	through	ouster	clauses;	
procedural	 changes	 to	 judicial	 review,	 e.g.	 amendments	 to	 standing	 criteria	 and	 the	
permission	test;		increasing	the	cost	of	judicial	review	by	reducing	legal	aid	or	increasing	court	
fees.
83
	Since	Pressure	Through	Law,	there	have	been	multiple	examples	of	clamping	down—
aside	 from	 the	 costs	 and	 funding	 issues	 discussed	 above,	 there	 have	 been	 many	 other	
instances.
84
	 Indeed,	 it	could	be	said	 that	 there	has	been	a	protracted	process	of	clamping	
down	on	judicial	review	in	recent	decades.	If	crowdfunding	is	effective	in	providing	resources	
for	public	interest	judicial	reviews,	new	reactions—whether	“striking	back”	in	individual	cases	
or	“clamping	down”	on	the	judicial	review	system	itself—may	be	on	the	cards.	If	crowdfunded	
cases	are	poorly	managed,	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	a	clamp	down	of	some	kind	not	happening.	
Beyond	the	question	of	the	government’s	reaction,	there	is	also	the	question	of	how	
the	judiciary	may	respond	to	any	increased	role	for	crowdfunding	in	PIL.	Judicial	review	is	in	
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many	 respects	 a	 discretionary	 jurisdiction,	 providing	 lots	 of	 scope	 for	 judicial	 attitudes	
(whether	hostility	or	embrace)	to	have	practical	consequences.	In	the	event	that	there	is	more	
poorly-managed,	or	simply	a	greater	volume	of,	PIL	due	to	crowdfunding,	judicial	discretion	
may	come	to	be	presumed	to	operate	against	crowdfunded	cases.	It	may	even	be	the	case	
that	 common	 law	principles	with	baked-in	hostility	 follow.	 The	mere	presence	and	use	of	
crowdfunding	 platform	 may	 also	 generate	 a—possibly	 very	 unhelpful	 and	 unrealistic—
expectation	that	claimants	seek	to	fundraise	 independently.	Of	course,	the	opposite	could	
happen	too.	There	are	examples	of	 the	 judiciary	 liberalising	gateways	 for	PIL	 funding.	The	
ruling	on	protective	costs	order	in	Corner	House	is	a	famous	instance
85
	and	there	have	been	
some	cases	where	judges	appear	to	take	the	presence	of	crowdfunding	as	positive	feature	of	
a	claimant’s	case.
86
	The	conduct	of	crowdfunded	cases	may	be	a	key	factor	in	this	respect.	
Crowdfunding	 of	 PIL	 can	 perhaps	 avoid	 the	 “ethical	 arguments”	 that	 investment-
based	crowd	funders	often	face,	i.e.	that	they	are	in	it	to	get	rich.	In	judicial	review,	there	is	
likely	to	be	no	immediate	“pot	of	gold”	to	be	seized	by	taking	a	case,	thereby	alleviating	any	
concerns	 that	 crowd	 funders	might	 be	 chasing	 a	 pecuniary	 end	 or	 that	 there	might	 be	 a	
conflict	of	interest	with	either	the	litigant	or	the	lawyers	in	the	case.		That	said,	lawyers	will	
likely	get	paid	out	of	crowdfunded	pots	of	money.	The	impression	that	PIL	is	a	“feeding	trough	
for	lawyers”	is	potentially	problematic.
87
		
Finally,	it	is	common	to	hear	the	argument	that	crowdfunding	is	not	a	genuinely	new	
practice,	it	just	puts	online	something	that	communities	have	done	for	many	years:	getting	
together	to	raise	money	for	litigation.	Some	might	say	that,	on	this	basis,	the	risks	identified	
here	ought	not	to	be	of	concern.	There	is,	no	doubt,	an	element	of	truth	to	this.	Indeed,	many	
judicial	review	claimants	may	still,	informally,	ask	family,	friends	or	their	local	community	for	
help	 with	 funding	 a	 case.	 But	 crowdfunding	 is	 more	 than	 simply	 the	 digitalisation	 of	 an	
existing	 practice.	 Though	 it	 may	 be	 able	 to	 claim	 its	 heritage	 is	 in	 informal	 community	
fundraising	 initiatives,	 crowdfunding	 is	 qualitatively	 different	 in	 multiple	 respects.	 For	
instance,	the	fact	the	fundraising	takes	place	online	means	it	is	more	widely	accessible	and	
that	 fundraising	campaigns	are	 likely	 to	be	more	widely	circulated.	Similar,	 campaigns	are	
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perhaps	 more	 likely	 to	 become	 a	 national	 political	 issue	 or	 be	 connected	 to	 an	 existing	
national	issue.	This	may	be	beneficial	in	many	respects,	but	it	is	still	a	substantial	difference.	
The	use	of	online	systems	also	creates	a	new,	important	actor:	the	platform	that	hosts	the	
campaigns.	 Platforms	 such	 as	 CrowdJustice	 are	 now	 key	 players	 in	 this	 area	 and	 possess	
power	to	affect	how	fundraising	campaigns	operate.	The	centralisation	of	this	task	therefore	
represents	 a	 material	 change	 to	 the	 old	 practice.	 Crowdfunding	 could	 well	 be	 overall	
beneficial	but	we	should	certainly	resist	any	suggestion	that	crowdfunding	campaigns	are	the	
same	as,	for	instance,	a	few	members	of	a	local	community	getting	together	to	challenge	an	
unwelcome	planning	decision.		
 
Towards	a	Practical	Ethics	
What	the	above	analysis	shows	is	that	crowdfunding	is	best	considered	a	risky	resource	in	the	
PIL	context.	It	is	risky	as	it	may	unsettle	various	established	parts	of	the	current	landscape	and	
have	a	range	of	unforeseen	consequences.	At	the	same	time,	crowdfunding	is	still	a	resource	
despite	 its	 possible	 flaws	 and	 consequences,	 and	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 provide	 litigation	
funding	where	 there	otherwise	 is	none.	The	next	challenge	 is	devising	an	approach	which	
optimises	 its	benefits	while	minimising	 risk.	 In	other	words,	 to	create	a	practical	ethics	of	
crowdfunding	 in	 the	 judicial	 review	 context.
88
	 The	 demand	 for	 this	 is,	 in	 many	 ways,	
exemplified	 by	 Jo	 Maugham	 QC’s	 reflections	 on	 his	 experiences	 of	 the	 practice	 of	
crowdfunding	 PIL—which	 often	 can	 be	 read	 as	 a	 lawyer	 seeking	 to	 understand	 the	
crowdfunding	of	PIL	within	the	framework	his	own	professional	ethics.
89
	In	this	final	part	of	
the	article,	I	sketch	the	shape	a	specific	ethics	of	crowdfunding	PIL	could	take.	
	 The	first	key	issue	is	who	ought	to	be	regulated.	The	story	of	the	rise	of	crowdfunding	
is	one	involving	numerous	actors:	judges,	lawyers,	NGOs,	crowdfunding	platforms	etc.	While	
all	of	 these	actors	ought	 to	act	carefully	and	ethically	 in	respect	of	crowdfunding,	 lawyers	
seem	the	best	to	orientate	a	practical	ethical	code	on	crowdfunding	towards.	 It	 is	 lawyers	
who	wield	the	most	significant	amount	of	power	in	the	bringing	and	conduct	of	crowdfunded	
PIL.	Platforms	often	use	lawyers	as	the	vetting	mechanism	for	cases	too.	In	addition,	lawyers	
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are	familiar	with	dealing	closely	with	the	ethics	of	their	practice	and	the	complexities	that	
arise	out	of	ethical	codes,	and	established	regulators	are	already	in	place.
90
	
	 The	second	and	third	issues	are	how	lawyers	ought	to	be	regulated	and	how	we	should	
reason	out	the	principles	that	constitute	the	practical	ethics.	Instructive	guidance	on	these	
questions	 can	 be	 found	 by	 looking	 at	 how	 solicitors’	 and	 barristers’	 ethics	 are	 presently	
regulated.	This	 is	done	primarily	through	flexible	codes	enforced	by	established	regulatory	
bodies.
91
	 These	 codes—though	 often	 framed	 in	 the	 language	 of	 “duties”—are	 broad	
principles	of	 ethical	 decision-making	which	 seek	 to	procure	a	 range	of	outcomes,	 such	as	
access	to	justice,	effective	representation,	fair	hearings	etc.
92
	They	are	not	hard	legal	rules	
but	soft	 framework	principles	that	are	designed	to	help	those	 involved	 in	 legal	practice	to	
work	through	challenges	which	arise	in	the	course	of	their	work.	Some	of	the	principles,	such	
as	 the	 cab-rank	 rule,	 have	 a	 long	history	 but	many	principles	 shift	with	 time	 and	 societal	
development.	For	instance,	in	recent	years	the	rule	relating	to	what	barristers	can	say	to	the	
press	have	changed.
93
	Developments	 in	 the	use	of	 technology	have	also	been	a	cause	 for	
revisiting	the	ethical	principles	regulating	legal	professionals.	Recently,	for	example,	the	Bar	
Standards	Board	issued	new	guidance	on	the	use	of	social	media.
94
	There	is	no	reason	why	
the	 crowdfunding	 activities	 of	 legal	 professionals—or	 legal	 professionals	 involved	 in	
crowdfunded	litigation—ought	not	to	be	subject	to	guidance	of	this	kind.	It	could	be	argued	
that	it	is	best	to	leave	this	area	of	legal	practice	unregulated	and	lawyers	ought	to	be	able	to	
navigate	 their	 way	 through	 crowdfunding	 litigation	 themselves,	 relying	 out	 the	 general	
principles	of	legal	practice	ethics.	However,	such	a	view	would	fail	to	properly	take	account	
of	the	very	real	and	particular	risks	presented	by	crowdfunding.	Moreover,	it	is	clear—merely	
from	 examining	 common	 high-profile	 examples	 of	 crowdfunded	 PIL,	 such	 as	 the	 junior	
doctors’	case,	Webster,	and	litigation	by	the	Good	Law	Project—that	lawyers	are	taking	very	
different	approaches	 to	conducting	cases.	For	 instance,	 the	approach	 to	 the	extent	which	
skeleton	arguments	and	other	key	litigation	documents	are	disclosed	via	the	crowdfunding	
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platform	differs	radically.	There	is	no	need	to	place	a	straightjacket	on	litigation	strategy,	but	
setting	a	general	ethical	baseline	on	issues	such	as	this	is	a	practical	necessity.	
	 Finally,	there	is	a	need	to	engage	closely	with	all	stakeholders	in	creating	an	ethical	
framework	for	crowdfunding.	The	understanding	of	crowdfunding	in	practice	is	developing	
quickly	but	it	is	still	forming.	As	such,	it	is	vital	that	experience	and	insight	is	drawn	from	a	
range	 of	 actors	 involved.	 At	 minimum,	 it	 seems	 important	 to	 involve	 judges,	 lawyers	
(especially	 those	 experienced	 with	 crowdfunding),	 regulators,	 charities	 (again,	 especially	
those	 experienced	 with	 crowdfunding	 PIL),	 professional	 associations,	 and	 crowdfunding	
platforms.	All	of	these	actors	have	an	interest	in	ensuring	an	appropriate	ethical	baseline	is	in	
place.	
 
Conclusion		
This	article	has	shown	the	role	that	crowdfunding	may	play	in	PIL	in	the	UK	and	how	it	has	
developed	in	recent	years.	No	doubt,	crowdfunding	can—in	certain	cases—solve	the	resource	
shortage	and	be	a	key	part	of	procuring	reform	via	PIL.	At	the	same	time,	many	aspects	of	it	
are	problematic	or	hold	the	potential	to	become	problematic.	The	nature	and	extent	of	the	
possible	risks	are	such	that	the	crowdfunding	of	PIL	should	be	approached	with	great	caution.		
The	peril	here	is	that	this	apparently	empowering	means	of	providing	resource	to	mobilise	
the	law	may	ultimately	have	consequences	which	undermines	the	project	of	PIL	as	a	whole.	
To	 this	 end,	 there	 is	 clear	 merit	 in	 considering	 the	 production	 of	 new	 guidelines	 for	
crowdfunding	PIL—principles	which	seek	to	balance	the	risks	and	opportunities	in	this	area.	
To	do	this,	there	is	a	need	to	devise	a	coherent	practical	ethics	of	crowdfunding	in	this	context.	
Here,	I	have	sketched	out	both	the	key	concerns	which	a	practical	ethics	must	be	informed	by	
and	the	shape	that	such	an	ethics	could	take.	It	is	hoped	this	suggestion	is	taken	forward	in	
the	coming	years	by	the	Bar	Standards	Board	and	the	Solicitors	Regulation	Authority.	At	the	
same	 time,	 it	 is	 hoped	 that	 all	 actors	 involved	 in	 crowdfunding	 judicial	 reviews	 consider	
closely	what	their	responsibilities	are.	
  
